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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a tremendous increase in eminent
domain proceedings. This activity is reflected at all levels of govern-
ment-local, state and federal-and the trend is not likely to be reversed
in the near future. The phenomenal growth in population, the changing
philosophy as to the proper sphere of public activity, the concentrations
of population in cities, suburbs, and "slurbs,"' the depreciation and obso-
lescence of roads, schools and other public buildings to the point where
they are inadequate, and the technological developments resulting in the
demand for new and better facilities, are simply a few of the obvious
reasons for increased land acquisitions by governmental units.
The need and likelihood of increased activity in just one area of
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
** Associate Professor of Economics, University of Miami.
1. "The resulting urban sprawl has led to the development of 'sloppy, sleazy, slovenly,
slip-shod, semi-cities' called 'slurbs.'" Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium
Or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962), citing WOOD & HELLER, CALIFORNIA
GOING, GOING ... 10 (1962). Ab
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public land acquisitions, and an area comparatively new to governmental
activity at that, has been aptly expressed by President Kennedy :2
[O]ur national household is cluttered with unfinished and
neglected tasks. Our cities are being engulfed in squalor. Twelve
long years after Congress declared our goal to be a decent home
and a suitable environment for every American family, we still
have 25 million Americans living in substandard homes. A new
housing program under a new Housing and Urban Affairs De-
partment will be needed this year.
The need for slum clearance, urban renewal projects, more schools,
better streets and highways, additional parks and playgrounds is prac-
tically everywhere self-evident. The completion and further development
of the inter-state highway program,8 new and improved tollways, urban
expressways, jet airports, and similar projects indicate to a slight extent
the degree to which governmental units are and will be acquiring land
for many years to come. Many of these acquisitions will result in con-
demnation litigation.
Perhaps the chief points of controversy in eminent domain proceed-
ings are the determinations of the value of the land taken and of the
estates or other property rights of the respective parties claiming an
interest therein. It is at this point, the determination of values, that the
fields of law and economics become of equal importance. Indeed, the
economic questions may be the dominant ones, but the rules and pro-
cedures circumscribing the methods of determination are predominantly
legal.
In condemnation proceedings the "customs of the trade" of real
estate appraisers have tended to influence the law. These customs are at
times in accord with sound economic principles,4 but at other times,
yielding to expediency and a desire for simplicity, they have thwarted
2. State of Union Message, Jan. 30, 1961, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 25, 29 (1961).
3. "The federal government has three basic highway programs. One provides for the
construction of an interstate highway system, authorized in 1956, to consist of 41,000 miles
of super-highways connecting all major cities in the country. It is scheduled for completion
in 1972. In 1961, the First Session of the 87th Congress authorized an increase in the
Federal share of the cost by $11.56 billion to $37 billion. See Public Law 87-61, U.S. Code
Cong. and Ad. News (1961), at 141. The states are building the interstate super-highways
system, and the federal government pays 90% of the cost on a pay-as-you-go basis from
the Federal Highway Trust Fund, which receives federal gasoline and other user taxes for
the purpose.
"The other two federal-aid highway programs constitute the so-called A-B-C program,
established in 1916, in which the federal government pays 50% of the costs of primary,
secondary, and urban roads constructed by the states. The bill that authorizes appropriations
for the A-B-C program usually adds authorizations for road construction on federal lands
and Indian reservations. The federal government builds these roads and pays the entire
costs." U.S. CorE CoNG. AD. & NEWS (1962), No. 11, at XV of Congressional and Administra-
tive Highlights.
1. See, e.g., text following note 29 infra.
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basic economic philosophy.5 It is the purpose of this paper to examine
these "customs of the trade" of appraisers, and to examine also the vari-
ous rules for ascertaining valuations and for apportioning awards between
a landlord and tenant when the condemned property is encumbered with
a lease. The soundness of these procedures from an economic viewpoint
will then be appraised.
II. THE THEORY AND PROBLEM OF JUST COMPENSATION:
THE UNENCUMBERED FEE
A. General Considerations
Federal' and state constitutions" impose general standards on the
measure of compensation to be awarded when private property is taken
under eminent domain proceedings. Although there are some variations
in phrasing, the limitation set in the Federal Constitution, and the one
most customarily applied, is that of "just compensation." 8 The charters
of government rarely elaborate as to what is meant by words like "just"
or "full"; hence the details must be supplied by the courts.
Ownership of land, of course, may be divided in many different ways
among many different people. Untold variables as to cotenancies, present
estates, future interests, marital rights, landlord-tenant relationships,
easements, covenants, mortgages, liens, and related security interests and
encumbrances may exist as to any one piece of realty. Most, if not all,
of the holders of these interests are entitled to a share in the proceeds.
The result depends somewhat on constitutional and statutory provisions
and on the substantiality of the claimant's interest.9
5. See, e.g., text following note 82 infra.
6. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of private property
without just compensation. The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from depriving a
person of his property without due process of law.
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14, for example, uses the standard of "just compensation," as
do CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11; GA. CoNsr. § 2-301 (1945); IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13; Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 26. LA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 2, uses "just and adequate compensation"; MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. X, "reasonable com-
pensation"; OHIo CONST. art. I, § 17, simply "compensation . . . in money"; and Tax.
CoNsT. art. I, § 17, "adequate compensation."
FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 12, uses the phrase "just compensation," whereas art. XVI,
§ 29 of the same constitution uses the phrase "full compensation." In a dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Thornal in Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108
So.2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1958), the suggestion is made that the requirement of just compensa-
tion applies to governmental agencies, and that full compensation applies to condemnations
by corporations or individuals.
8. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
9. An option to purchase which has not ripened into a mutually binding contract is
not such a property interest as to entitle the optionee to a share in the award. Cravero v.
Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956); 4 NicHOLS, EMxNxrN DoMAIN
28 (1962).
The owner of riparian rights is entitled to compensation. Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla.
544, 82 So. 221 (1919); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909); Monmouth
1963]
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The usual method of procedure in condemnation of land burdened
with split ownership or encumbrances is to determine first the whole
value of the land or property as if it were unencumbered, and then to
apportion the award among the various claimants.' The following para-
graphs list and appraise the methods of valuation commonly employed
in arriving at the total value of the property taken. Afterwards, the
Consol. Water Co. v. Blackburn, 72 N.J. Super. 377, 178 A.2d 377 (1962) ; JAHR, EMINENT
DoMAn 64 (1962).
An owner of an easement is entitled to compensation when it is condemned. City of
Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
There is a conflict of authority as to whether the right to enforce a restrictive covenant
or equitable servitude is property, requiring compensation when a parcel of restricted land
is condemned for public purposes contrary to the restricted uses. See Britton v. School
Dist. of Univ. City, 328 Mo. 1185, 44 S.W.2d 33 (1931), requiring compensation, and Board
of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955), not requiring
compensation. Additional cases are collected in Annots., 17 A.L.R. 554 (1922), 67 A.L.R. 385
(1930), and 122 A.L.R. 1464 (1939). See also Comment, 38 MIcr. L. REV. 357 (1940).
The majority view is that a wife's inchoate dower is extinguished by eminent domain
and that she is not entitled to a lien on the proceeds; but a minority of jurisdictions estimate
the value of the dower interest and apportion the award. Cases can be found in 4 Nic OLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.71(1) (1962); and 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
507-08 (2d ed. 1953).
A mortgagee is entitled to protection whenever the entire mortgaged estate is condemned,
but the nature of the remedy depends upon the jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, the
mortgagor is assigned the entire award, but the mortgagee may in equity have the award
applied to the payment of the debt. In other jurisdictions the mortgagee participates in the
condemnation proceedings, and the award takes the place of the condemned land with the
various liens formerly applicable to the land now attaching to the award. The liens are
then paid according to their priorities, with any residue representing the mortgagor's share.
In the case of partial takings, various solutions have been reached. See generally 1 ORGEL,
op. cit. supra at 485-502.
A mortgagee is not an "owner" within the meaning of FLA. STAT. §§ 73.11, 73.12 (1961),
so as to be entitled to an attorney's fee when the property is condemned. Shavers v. Duval
County, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954). When all of the mortgaged land is taken, the mortgagee
is entitled to so much of the award as is necessary to satisfy the mortgage debt. Seaboard
All-Florida Ry. v. Leavitt, 105 Fla. 600, 141 So. 886 (1932) (dictum).
The holders of security interests other than mortgages are treated substantially the
same as mortgage holders, but some procedural differences may arise. 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra
at 502-06.
The holder of a possibility of reverter or right of re-entry is generally not entitled to a
portion of the award if the fee simple defeasible were not likely to terminate within a rea-
sonably short period without regard to the condemnation. United Baptist Convention v.
East Weare Baptist Church, 103 N.H. 521, 176 A.2d 325 (1961); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 53, comment b (1936). But see Stoyles, Condemnation of Future Interests, 43 IOWA L.
REV. 241 (1958) ; Note, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 631 (1961).
An advertising company was held not entitled to compensation for the loss of its right
to place billboards on the condemned land since it had only a contract right and not a
property right. Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Linzell, 168 Ohio St. 259, 153 N.E.2d 773
(1958), affirming 107 Ohio App. 351, 152 N.E.2d 380 (1958), which categorized the relation-
ship as licensor-licensee rather than lessor-lessee.
The holders of an executory interest were held entitled to compensation in Hemphill v.
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 145 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1962).
10. Carlock v. United States, 53 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; American Oil Co. v. State
Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 496, 177 A.2d 358 (1962); 4 NICuoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.36 [11
(1962); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 109 (2d ed. 1953), both citing many
cases; Part III infra.
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methods commonly used to apportion the award in one situation of
divided ownership, namely that of landlord and tenant, are delineated
and appraised.
The ideal of just compensation has been aptly expressed by the
United States Supreme Court as:
the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken [whereby the owner is put] in as good a position pecu-
niarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken. 1
Although the concept of just compensation is necessarily a flexible one,
there is almost unanimous agreement that "fair market value" is an
acceptable criterion in those cases where the property has a market
value. 2 "Market value" as used by most courts means a competitive price
established in a free market:
It is nothing more or less than what the subject would sell
for in the open market, exposed to all bidders in the regular
course of trade and competition which ordinarily obtain with
respect to their particular class of subject. Nothing short of an
actual sale of a tract of land in the open market can fix defi-
nitely and certainly its market value. Until so sold, what it will
bring in a fair and open market, is mere matter of opinion, and
while divergence in view is in most cases to be expected, rarely,
however, so marked as in the present case. Nevertheless, it is
from these opinions, based upon the general selling price of
land, however divergent, that the law seeks to arrive at an esti-
mate that will serve the ends of practical justice.'"
This criterion of market value is in general accord with the economic
concept of a market price determined in a highly competitive market.
Any price determined on a market is the necessary out-
growth of the interplay of the forces operating, that is, demand
and supply. Whatever the market situation which generated this
11. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
12. State v. Richard, 135 So.2d 319 (La. App. 1961) ; 4 NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra note 10,
§ 12.2 and cases cited therein.
13. Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Pa. 484, 487, 78 At. 1039 (1911).
Cf. the following definitions: "It is 'the highest price established in terms of money
which the land would bring ... in the open market, with reasonable time allowed in which
to find a purchaser . . . .'" Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrin Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255,
258, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250, 252 (1959), quoting Sacramento So. R.R. v. Helibron, 156 Cal. 408,
104 Pac. 979, 980 (1909).
"The market value means the fair value of the property as between one who wants to
purchase and one who wants to sell, not what could be obtained for it under peculiar
circumstances when a greater than its fair price could be obtained, nor its speculative value;
not a value obtained from the necessities of another; nor, on the other hand, is it to be
limited to that price which the property would bring when forced off at auction under the
hammer. It is what it would bring at a fair public sale when one party wanted to sell and
the other to buy." Kansas City, W. & N.W.R.R. v. Fisher, 49 Kan. 17, 18, 30 Pac. III
(1892).
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price may be, with regard to it the price is always adequate,
genuine, and real. It cannot be higher if no bidder ready to offer
a higher price turns up, and it cannot be lower if no seller ready
to deliver at a lower price turns up. Only the appearance of such
people ready to buy or sell can alter prices.' 4
Further, the requirement that the "perfect equivalent in money" is
market value has solved the enigma arising from the fact that value is a
word of many meanings. 5 The truth of this statement has long been
recognized by economists who have written extensively on such subjects
as "value in use and value in exchange." In declaring "value in exchange,"
i.e., market value, to be the desirable standard for computing a condem-
nation award, the courts have given legal sanction to two basic economic
precepts: (1) Since money functions as a common denominator of all
values, it is the only acceptable standard by which value can be objec-
tively measured; (2) All values, other than market value, are subjective
values and hence are not conducive to objective measurement.',
A court that utilizes the criterion of market value and recognizes
that "nothing short of an actual sale of a tract of land in the open market
can fix definitely and certainly its market value,' 7 demonstrates a re-
markable insight into the phenomenon of market prices. Confirmation of
this principle is readily found in the literature of the economist:
Prices are a market phenomenon. They are generated by the
market process and are the pith of the market economy. There
is no such thing as prices outside the market. Prices cannot be
constructed synthetically, as it were. They are the result of a
certain constellation of market data, of actions and reactions of
the members of society. 18
B. Criteria of Value
Logically, there are three standards of valuation which might be
applied to property taken under eminent domain: 9 (1) value to the
condemnor; (2) value to the condemnee; and, (3) value to other persons
as evidenced by market value. The courts have been almost unanimous
in refusing as a test of damages the value to the condemnor,2 but evi-
14. VON MIsES, HUMAN ACTION, A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 393 (1949).
15. See generally JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 94-101 (1953).
16. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 62-63 (8th ed. 1946). See also VON MIsEs,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 215-18, DODD & HAILSTONES, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND APPUCA-
TIONS 360-62 (4th ed. 1961) ; 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 347 (1957 ed.).
17. See the quotation from Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., note 13 supra.
18. VON MISES, op. cit. supra note 14, at 392.
19. 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1[5] (1962); 1 OROEL, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 73.
20. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913); 4
NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 19, § 12.21.
Indeed the primary object of the power to condemn property for a public purpose
would be defeated if this measure of compensation were adopted .... [This] is so
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dence of this value may at times come in the "back door" and be con-
sidered as an element of fair market value.
21
In ordinary situations, a value-to-the-taker standard would severely
penalize the property owner, since, generally, the use of the property by
the condemning authority would not be for its highest and best use. For
example, when a home or business is taken for highway purposes, the
condemning authority is interested only in the land, and the building
improvement to the authority is not only worth very little, but may
actually be a liability since it must be destroyed or moved. This theory
of value to the taker has been advanced in only a few cases by property
owners who hold barren or unproductive land.22
The "value to the owner" test has generally, at least until recent
years, been rejected with few exceptions. The exceptions have included
structures especially adapted to the use of the present owner-situations
where the court has said that the properties had no market value. The
best examples are churches, private schools and colleges, and unusually
expensive residences.
23
The fair market value standard, as previously stated,24 is the basic
and generally applied criterion of value in eminent domain proceedings.
This has been variously defined, but generally may be stated as the will-
ing buyer-willing seller test. This standard assumes that neither party is
under compulsion to buy or sell, and that both are fully advised as to
all relevant and material facts. The explanation of a California appellate
court is more or less typical. Market value is:
the highest price estimated in terms of money . . . which the
land would bring if exposed for sale in the open market with
reasonable time allowed in which to find a purchaser, buying
with the knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which it was
adapted and for which it is capable.25
generally recognized that it cannot be considered open to argument. 1 ORCEL, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 74.
21. "What is open to argument, however, is the contention that the owner of condemned
property should be allowed some 'fair share' of its special value to the taker .. " 1 ORGEL,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 74.
22. See Black, Fair Market Value and Just Compensation, TECHNICAL VALUATION 37
(Oct. 1960); 1 ORGEL, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 355-59.
23. In Idaho-W. Ry. v. Columbia Synod, 20 Idaho, 568, 583, 119 Pac. 60, 65 (1911),
the court stated: "Whenever the property is of such value and nature that it has no market
value, its value 'for the uses and purposes to which it is devoted, and to which it is
peculiarly adaptable,' may be shown."
The premise that churches or church property have no market value may be ques-
tioned. Certainly, a church would have some market value, even if only for use as a ware-
house or, to be extreme, for the value of the land on which it is located. However, what
the court probably had in mind was the fact that churches are not bought and sold often
enough to set a fair market value standard, and that the market value for other uses would
be so much less than its value for use as a church as to be shocking to the court's sense
of justice. Thus, under such circumstances, the court will engraft an exception to the general
rule without otherwise abandoning or overruling it. See also notes 34 and 100 infra.
24. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
25. City of Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal. App. 491, 492-93, 7 P.2d 378 (1932).
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The fair market value test has been modified in favor of the land-
owner by application of the "highest and best use" test, a typical ex-
planation of which is:
Just compensation includes all elements of value that in-
here in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly
determined. The sum required to be paid to the owner does not
depend upon the uses to which he has devoted his land but it is
to be arrived at upon just consideration of all uses for which it
is suitable. The highest and most profitable use for which the
property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the
reasonably near future is to be considered not necessarily as
the measure of value, but to the full extent that the prospect
of demand for such use affects the market value while the
property is privately held. 6
Evidence of the highest and best use for which the property is situ-
ated necessarily means that the fair market value of the land condemned
will not be determined solely in reference to the uses to which the land
is currently applied. Consideration is to be given to all uses for which
the land is available, including uses for which it is likely to be needed
in the reasonably near future.27 However, the courts have not as yet
opened the door carte blanche to evidence of other uses to which the
property might be put. Restrictions on the use of this kind of evidence
are common.
28
C. Experts and Their Appraisal Techniques
Expert witnesses as to the value of the land taken are either pro-
fessional appraisers or dealers in real estate. These appraisers value real
estate by three basic methods: (1) the market data approach, (2) the
26. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
27. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936) ; Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246 (1934) ; Karlson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) ; Brewster v. United States,
292 U.S. 246 (1934); Cameron Dev. Co. v. United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1944);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 132 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Swift & Co. v.
Housing Authority, 106 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958); Rothman v. Commonwealth, 406
Pa. 579, 178 A.2d 605 (Pa. 1962).
28. "To warrant admission of testimony as to the value for purposes other than that
to which the land is being put, or to which its use is limited by ordinance at the time of the
taking, the landowner must first show: (1) that the property is adaptable to the other use,
(2) that it is reasonably probable that it will be put to the other use within the immediate
future, or within a reasonable time, (3) that the market value of the land had been en-
hanced by the other use for which it is adaptable." Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank
& Trust Co., 100 So.2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958). See also City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153
Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808 (1954) ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878) ; School Dist.
No. 13 of Town of Huntington v. Wicks, 227 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See notes 41
and 43 infra and accompanying text.
Under the above limitations, evidence of increased value has been allowed to show what
the property would be worth if it were zoned more realistically, or more in accordance with
surrounding land and development. Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co.,
supra; Swift & Co. v. Housing Authority, 106 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958) ; Long Beach
City High School Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 185 P.2d 585 (1947) ; City of Austin v.
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income approach and (3) the cost approach.29 The market data approach
is the one most frequently used, and the one given the greatest weight
by both appraisers and the courts. Its preference is undoubtedly due to
the fact that it most nearly corresponds to the legal concept of fair
market value.
The market data approach is founded upon the economic principle
of substitution, i.e., "the value of a property tends to be set by the cost
of acquisition of an equally desirable substitute property, assuming no
costly delay is encountered in making the substitution."" ° Perhaps the
simplest form of comparison in the valuation process is the substitution
of one vacant lot for another. If, for example, a vacant lot recently sold
for $5,000, and this lot is identical in all respects except location to the
one being taken, and the location is similar, then a fair value for the
condemned lot is $5,000.
The market data approach, however, does not have complete validity
when it is applied to a combination of land and buildings, or what is
otherwise described as improved property. Improved properties raise
many problems in determining market price since seldom can two build-
ings be found that are of like construction, similarly environed, and per-
fect substitutes for each other.
In the absence of an absolute comparison the expert witnesses must
state an opinion based upon market data. The principal weakness of this
approach lies not in its theory but in its practice. It is the unfortunate
tendency of the condemnee's witnesses to stretch high while the con-
demnor's equally competent experts stoop low as they state their opinions
of market value.3
Cannizzo, supra; Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 734 (1954);
People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 369 P.2d 1 (1962).
Other probable changes which may increase value include the filling of unfilled land and
the transformation of raw acreage into a subdivision. City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202
Cal. 731, 262 Pac. 737 (1927) ; Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C.
378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959) ; Rothman v. Commonwealth, 406 Pa. 579, 178 A.2d 605 (1962) ;
Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v. Collins, 357 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962);
State v. Barrilleaux, 139 So.2d 242 (La. App. 1962).
29. A discussion of each method combined with a typical example can be found in
NORTH & RING, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 374-75 (1961); Condist, The
Appraiser's Yardsticks, AMERICAN INSTITUTE or REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SELECTED
READING IN REAL ESTATE A'PRASAL 215 (1953); Allison, The Three Approaches To Value,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 181
(1961).
A comparison of results using the three methods in the appraisal of residential property
can be found in State v. Fridge, 135 So.2d 325 (La. App. 1961).
30. Schmutz, Evolution of the Interpretation of Appraisal Principles, AMERICAN INSTI-
TUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SELECTED READINGS IN REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 169, 175
(1953). That a comparison of recent sales in the same area is the best method of determining
value, see Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Gwin, 138 So.2d 175 (La. App. 1962).
31. See the excerpt from Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. reprinted in text
accompanying note 13 supra. Many examples of extremely wide divergencies in the estimates
of the appraisers can be found in Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in An Age of
Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 73 (1957).
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The income approach as a theory of appraising value utilizes the
concept of capitalized income as the value of the property. It emerges
from the theory that buyers and sellers of income-producing assets con-
sider income a yardstick by which value is measured. The process is
sometimes referred to as "capitalizing expected future income," which is
in effect simply a process of determining the current value on the basis
of a going rate of interest. An income of $5,000 per year is worth $100,000
when the normal going rate of interest is five per cent. A more detailed
analysis of this approach is discussed later in connection with the valua-
tion of leasehold estates.
The cost approach is computed in three stages: (1) estimating the
value of the land as if vacant; (2) estimating the current reproduction
cost of the existing improvements and deducting any accrued deprecia-
tion; (3) then adding the value of the land to the depreciated cost of
the improvement.3 2
Three types of costs may have significance: original cost, repro-
duction cost and replacement cost. The original cost in this context prob-
ably means the amounts spent by the present owner. It is rarely if ever
used as a test of value. Reproduction cost is the cost of reproducing the
exact improvement that is on the land; while replacement cost is the cost
of replacing the improvement with one of a similar but not identical
structure. As a practical matter, replacement rather than reproduction
would be the more likely procedure in the event of a fortuitous loss of
a building except in those rare instances where the building was very
new and extremely functional. Where the issue arises, the courts are more
likely to talk in terms of reproduction cost, although replacement ideas
are also present in that allowances are made for depreciation and obso-
lescence.83
It is fundamental, from a standpoint of law as well as economics,
that improvements are valuable only when they enhance the market value
of the property. For example, a motion picture theatre of a highly ornate
32. Allison, The Three Approaches To Value, op. cit. supra note 29, at 183.
33. 4 NIcHOLS, op. cit. supra note 19, § 12.313[l; JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 241-43 (2d
ed. 1953).
The secondary role of cost as an element of value in condemnation cases is illustrated by
the following:
They (meaning the appraisers] relied largely upon reproduction costs calculated
on a rule of thumb cubic footage basis, less depreciation. The testimony of one
appraiser, especially, would have led the jury to believe this is a formula for
arriving at the fair market value. This is not so. While the jury could be informed
by the witness of these calculations in explanation of the process by which he
arrived at his opinion of fair market value, the calculations are not themselves
evidence of fair market value for this type of property. There is no necessary
relationship between reproduction cost and market value. Cost of reproduction is a
method of valuation usually resorted to "where the character of the property is
such as not to be susceptible to the application of the market value doctrine."
Riley v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641, 644 (D.C. Cir.
1957). See also note 34 infra.
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design built in 1920 would cost a tremendous amount of money to repro-
duce in 1963, but the market value of the property would hardly be
enhanced by such a structure. If such a building were duplicated in 1962,
the owner would be incorporating into the improvement a considerable
amount of functional obsolescence which could never be recovered in a
current market.
Thus costs, including each type of costs mentioned above, are not as
a rule either singularly or collectively used to determine value. The test
is market value and evidence of costs where applicable is used only as
an aid to that determination. The award must be based on the value of
the land as affected or enhanced by the improvement. 4 Thus, obsoles-
cence and the utility of the building must be considered in arriving at
value of the improved land. One of the objections to using reproduction
costs as a basis for the award is that the technique invariably leads to
an excessive award unless it is adequately discounted for obsolescence,
inadequacy and physical depreciation."5
D. Excluded Elements of Value
Although the courts are solicitous of the landowner, they normally
exclude certain elements of value. These exclusions are based on sound
economid reasons in that the proffered elements have only remote, spec-
ulative or inconsequential probative utility in reaching the standard of
fair market value. Five of the elements which are excluded, except in
unique cases, are business profits, assessed valuation, special value to the
owner, speculative uses of the property, and inability to find a new busi-
ness location.
The courts have made a distinction between income from rent and
income from conducting a business on the property. While income from
rentals is accepted3 as evidence of market value, profits are normally
rejected.87 The reason for excluding profits is that the amount of profits
34. 4 NicHOLS, op. cit. supra note 19, § 13.313. Of course, where the land is not
regarded as having a market value, then reproduction costs or other criteria may be
employed to determine its value. See Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v. State Road Dep't,
138 So.2d 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), allowing reproduction cost in the valuation of a church.
Additional cases may be found in note 100 infra.
35. A suggestion has been advanced that evidence of reproduction cost should be
admitted, but that it should be regarded as setting the upper limit upon a valuation derived
by any other method, save in those rare instances where the owner of the property can
produce satisfactory proof that a higher value of combined land and structure is warranted.
It has also been suggested that structural cost should be recognized as an inferior measure
of value, to be given weight only where more satisfactory evidence based on actual sales
or earning power is not available, and whenever reproduction cost is offered as evidence, the
court should make every effort to assure a full deduction for those elusive forms of
depreciation, obsolescence and inadequacy that are so often disregarded by all but the
most careful appraisers. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 57 (2d ed. 1953).
36. Armory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947); State v. Cerruti,
188 Ore. 103, 214 P.2d 346 (1950).
37. Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 34 N.E.2d 623
1963]
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depends on many intangibles such as the general level of business activity
and the skill and ability of the management.
Because undervaluation of property by tax assessors is rather com-
mon, it is generally the condemnor who attempts to present assessed
valuation as a criteria of value. The courts have been almost unanimous
in rejecting this evidence3" because assessed values are fixed by tax
agents whose function is purely administrative and whose evidence is
assembled without a hearing.
Sentimental value or special value to the owner is intrinsic value,
which is not an acceptable basis for the determination of market value.3
The courts have accepted the economic doctrine that it is impossible to
determine an objective market price based on purely subjective reasoning
such as sentimental value.40
Evidence of speculative or imaginative use of the property is nor-
mally excluded.4 1 A federal district court in Alabama is more or less
typical in its statement of the reason for rejecting this evidence.
In considering the measure of damages or compensation to be
paid for said lands, possible, probable or imaginary uses are
not to be considered. Such uses would be remote and 'specula-
tive.42
It may be noted, however, that although evidence of imaginative or
speculative use is not admitted, evidence of the property's suitability and
(1941); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Ladner, 137 So.2d 791 (Miss. 1962).
Sparkhill Realty Corp. v. State, 268 N.Y. 192, 197 N.E. 192 (1935).
In Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So.2d 354 (1947), however, the
operator of a service station was allowed his business profits of $600 per month while his
station was being reconstructed and returned to operation.
38. Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little Ferry, 15 N.J. Super. 43, 83
A.2d 4 (1951); Myers v. Daytona Beach, supra note 37; United States v. Certain Parcels
of Land, 261 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1958). Contra, Garabedian v. City of Worcester, 338 Mass.
48, 153 N.E.2d 622 (1958).
39. In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.2d 272
(1943); In re Condemnation by City of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 765, 114 S.E.2d 635 (1960);
Cane Belt Ry. v. Hughes, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 72 S.W. 1020 (1903).
See, however, note 23 supra as to property which has no established market value.
40. See text accompanying notes 16 supra; State v. Schlick, 142 Tex. 410, 179 S.W.2d
246 (1944).
41. Coral-Glade Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, 122 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960);
Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N.E.2d 148 (1952) ; Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 278 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Santa Clara
County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Freitas, 177 Cal. App. 2d 264, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1960); School Dist. No. 13 v. Wicks, 227 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (value
based on possible zoning change too remote or speculative but value based on special
exception to permit partial business use admissible) ; Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v.
Buckles, 24 Ill. 2d 520, 182 N.E.2d 169 (1962) ; People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Cal.
App. 1962) ; People ex rel. State Park Comm'n v. Johnson, - Cal. App. 2d -, 22
Cal. Rptr. 149 (1962).
42. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 250 Fed. 299, 302 (M.D. Ala. 1918).
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potential for more valuable utilization is allowable on the question of the
highest and best use.4"
The inability to find a new business location is not acceptable as a
measure of damages.44 Market value implies as a necessary concomitant
the value of a similar property in the market. If the owner receives the
market value of the property taken, he can theoretically, at any rate,
replace that property with a similar piece of property at the same price.
E. Fair Market Value; Appraisal
The fair market value standard works well in many, perhaps in most
cases. It is flexible, functional, very easy to comprehend, and generally
fair. However, there is no reason to believe that it will always be applied
in the same manner, or that changing circumstances may not warrant
modifications.
Already fair market value has been enlarged to include evidence of
the highest and best use, even to the extent, in some circumstances, of
permitting evidence of increased value were a change in zoning to take
place. Cases of particular hardship may result in making fair market
value the sole criterion inadequate.45
Occasionally, particular statutes provide for additional items of
compensation. For example, under the Federal Urban Renewal Law,46
moving costs up to a certain amount are allowed owners of both con-
demned houses and businesses. New York allows moving costs for dis-
placed tenants up to a maximum of $500 for businesses when land is
condemned for Public Housing projects.47 Florida has a damage-to-
business statute, 48 but it is of limited application. The courts also occa-
43. See notes 26 and 28 supra.
44. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
45. In LIFE, June 20, 1960, at 49, there appeared a story concerning a valley to be
flooded as part of a reservoir for a flood control dam. A town of 3,000 people was to be
destroyed, and those people had to be moved and relocated. Included in the article was
the following: "The cost of resettling and the beginning of new lives came high. New
property usually costs more than the fees awarded for the old. It was a sad wrench,
especially for the old people." Allowance for resettlement costs in many instances might be
warranted.
See Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses,
67 YALE L.J. 61, 74 (1957) for a pointed criticism of the market value approach. "Despite
this black-letter approach, courts, either by stretching the market value standard or by
frankly admitting that its strict application would be unjust, have often granted com-
pensation for incidentals to avoid an otherwise unconscionable award. As a result, the
standard in practice operates unequally, with some condemnees fully indemnified while many
others are forced to bear considerable losses. Thus, although these judicial techniques may
produce desirable results when utilized, they do not operate to effect a uniform system for
compensation of incidential losses. Rather, as instances of departure from the market value
standard, they cast further doubt on the wisdom of maintaining that formula as a barrier
to compensating such losses."
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1456(f) (2) (1962 Supp.).
47. N.Y. PuB. HousING LAW § 153, para. 1 (McKinney's 1962 Supp.). This statute limits
the amount in the case of families to a maximum of $200.00.
48. FLA. STAT. § 73.10(4) (1961):
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sionally step beyond the bounds of fair market value and permit the
consideration of other elements.49
Thus it may be expected that the concept of fair market value will
expand or contract as the equities of the situation demand in the light
of evolving moral and ethical standards. The concept is in itself a satis-
factory standard in many cases, and it serves as a focal point in others
where deviations may be justified because of particular fact situations.
It generally conforms to sound economic principles, and the courts have
achieved a pragmatic harmony of economic and legal theory in the admin-
istration of condemnation litigation.
III. THE ENCUMBERED OR DIVIDED FEE: APPORTIONMENT
A. General Considerations
When the ownership of condemned land is split or fractionalized
among two or more persons, the undivided fee rule is generally followed
A condemnation suit being an action in rem, in such a suit by the state road
department, county, municipality, board, district, or other public body for the
condemnation of a road rights-of-way, borrow pits or drainage easements or other
rights-of-way the condemnation jury shall determine solely the amount of com-
pensation to be awarded for the property taken and damages to the remaining
property, if any. Provided, however, that when the suit is by the state road depart-
ment, county, municipality, board, district or other public body for the condemna-
tion of a right-of-way, and the effect of the taking of the property involved may
damage or destroy an established business of more than five years standing, owned
by the party whose lands being so taken, located upon adjoining lands owned or
held by such party, the jury shall consider the probable effect the denial of the use
of the property so taken may have upon the said business, and assess in addition
to the amount to be awarded for the taking, the probable damages to such business
which the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause; any
person claiming the right to recover such special damages shall set forth in his
answer the nature and extent of such damages.
The statute was applied in Guarria v. State Road Dep't, 117 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1960), and in Hooper v. State Road Dep't, 105 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958), the former
denying recovery for damage to business where the business property was taken in its
entirety, and the latter permitting such recovery where the business had been in existence
for more than five years but the then owner had operated it only for about a year at the
time of condemnation.
49. I jurther charge you gentlemen, that the constitutional provision as to just and
adequate compensation does not necessarily restrict the lessee's recovery to market
value. The lessee is entitled to just and adequate compensation for his property;
that is, the value of the property to him, not its value to the Housing Authority.
The measure of damages for property taken by eminent domain, being compen-
satory in its nature, is the loss sustained by the owner, taking into consideration
all the relevant factors.
Housing Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 884, 87 S.E.2d
671, 675 (1955).
We feel our constitutional provision for full compensation requires that the
courts determine the value of the property by taking into account all facts and
circumstances which bear a reasonable relationship to the loss occasioned the owner
by virtue of the taking of his property under the right of eminent domain. . ..
Although fair market value is an important element in the compensation formula,
it is not an exclusive standard in this jurisdiction. Fair market value is merely
a tool to assist us in determining what is full or just compensation within the
purview of our constitutional requirement.
Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So.2d 289, 291 (Fla. 1959),
allowing moving costs to the owner.
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in determining the value of the land taken." The theory behind this rule
is that the land itself is taken and not the separate interests of different
persons in the land. Compensation is thus awarded for the land itself, not
for the sum of the different interests therein." This procedure makes for
speedy condemnation and precision in forecasting the probable cost of
acquisition.
To the undivided fee rule, however, there are exceptions. The most
common exception is the case of land burdened with easements. In many
cases land burdened with easements, as for light, air, ingress and egress,
is worth considerably less than the same land if unencumbered.52 Free-
dom of use is greatly restricted by the presence of the easements and the
market value greatly lessened. Further, the easements themselves gen-
erally have no market apart from the dominant tenement to which they
are attached, and if the land is taken for highway or similar purposes,
the former easement holder is often damaged in no way whatsoever.
Thus, in these and similar cases, the courts have refused to follow the
usual formula and have held that account must be taken of the state of
title, and the compensation must be assessed on the basis of the valuation
of the separate interests in the property.53 This means that the amount
that must be paid by the condemning authority is usually considerably
less than what would have to be paid if the land were valued as an unen-
cumbered fee.
Initially and as an abstract proposition, the question as to whether
the sum of the values of the separate interests must be equivalent to the
value of the unencumbered fee is interesting and complex. Prima facie,
it might seem that the answer should be a resounding yes, that the total
of the separate interests must equal the value of the whole. The case of
50. In re Mackie's Petition, 115 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. 1962); State ex rel. Kafka v.
District Court, 128 Minn. 432, 151 N.W. 144 (1915); 4 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 12.3611] (1962), and cases cited therein.
51. People v. S. & E. Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53 (1956);
Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956) ; City of Ashland v.
Price, 318 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1958) ; State v. Anderson, 176 Minn. 525, 223 N.W. 923 (1929) ;
St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092,, 64 S.W.2d 600 (1933); Reckson, Lessee's Right To Jury
Trial In Eminent Domain, 16 U. MiAms L. REv. 102, 106 (1961).
52. JAHR, EmINENT DomAIN 169 (1953); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT
DOMAIN § 107 (2d ed. 1953).
53. First Parish in Woburn v. Middlesex County, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 106 (1856)
(condemnation for highway purposes of land held by town for only parochial purposes
and which was used for a meeting house); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217
U.S. 189 (1910), affirming 195 Mass. 338, 81 N.E. 244 (1907) (taking of a fee, a private
way, subject to easements of light, air and way for use as a public street) ; United States v.
Gould, 301 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1962) (indicating that owner of fee underlying dedicated
streets or "streets" burdened with private easements of access if dedication not complete
would be entitled to only nominal damages); In re 106th Ave. N.E., 370 P.2d 861 (Wash.
1962) (landowner entitled to only nominal damages when private street transformed into
public street) ; Rogers v. State Roads Comm'n, 177 A.2d 850 (Md. 1962) (restrictive
covenant against commercial purposes considered in valuation). See also 1 ORGEL, op. cit.
supra note 52, § 111.
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the land encumbered with easements has already been noted. Obviously,
the land free of easements may be worth considerably more than the
land so burdened. And it does not follow that the value of the easements
to their respective holders is necessarily equivalent to the loss in value
of the encumbered land. Many instances may be conceived where the
value to an easement holder may be relatively light, but at the same time
the easement may lessen considerably the value of the burdened fee. 4
Likewise, in the condemnation of real estate to which there is an
appurtenant easement, the land and the easement should be valued sep-
arately and the results added.55 The appurtenant easement is a separate
property right which is being taken in addition to the fee. The fee is
enhanced by the existence of the easement, and the owner should be
compensated for both interests when the two are taken from him. In case
the various ownership interests in the land are other than easements, the
general effect on market value is not so clear. For example, a lessor's
interest might be either enhanced or diminished by the existence of a
particularly favorable or unfavorable lease, or by the lessee being either
a very valuable tenant with considerable know-how and resources or by
being just the opposite.
The general use of the undivided fee rule may be easily misunder-
stood. At first glance it lends some credence to the criticism:
Courts have frequently displayed a keen desire to oversimplify
the process of valuation in eminent domain. It is far easier, and
makes for greater expedition of a case to value property as
unencumbered. If ownership is divided, it is simpler to consider
the fee value and then appropriate that value according to the
respective interests in the entire property.5 6
In practice the undivided fee rule often works to the advantage of
the landowner. The rule is sound from an economic viewpoint in that it
permits consideration of all relevant factors contributing to the value
of the realty. Conversely, however, it disregards many existing factors
which tend to diminish the value of the property taken.17 Thus, in many
54. This would be particularly true in the case of private "street easements" if the con-
demnation were for the purpose of converting them into public streets. See note 53 supra.
Also an easement of way, for example, could have been created across one parcel for the
benefit of another at a time when it was the only practical way of access, but the con-
struction of a new public road on the other side of the dominant tenement could render the
easement of slight value to the dominant estate but at the same time lessen considerably the
value of the servient estate.
55. United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910); Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108
Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (1928) ; In re West Tenth St., 267 N.Y. 212, 196 N.E. 30 (1935).
56. JAHR, op. cit. supra note 52, at 172.
57. For example, consideration of the highest and best use tends to minimize the
)present use being made of the land. It also tends to minimize the effect of restrictive
covenants or present zoning regulations which may preclude or impede further develop-
ment of the land. See notes 27, 28 supra. See also text immediately following this footnote
for an example of how an outstanding lease may adversely effect present values.
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cases it will be found that the value of the unencumbered fee will be
greater than the total value of the separate interests. This may be illus-
trated by consideration of a hypothetical case of realty subject to a
leasehold.
We may assume, for purposes of illustration, that a lease has a long
period before expiration, and that it contains many restrictive clauses.
Under these circumstances the lessee has little opportunity to exploit
fully the potential productivity of the land, and the value of the leasehold
interest is therefore relatively low. Similarly, the landlord can not utilize
the land for the highest and best use because the privilege of user,
although restricted by the lease, belongs to the tenant. While the landlord
may enjoy the rental income, this income may be substantially less than
the property is capable of earning. Thus, both the lessor and the lessee
suffer.
In such a situation, it seems obvious that the sum total of the two
separate interests will be less than the "fair market value" as an unen-
cumbered fee. The determination of a condemnation award by ascertain-
ing the value of the lease, as evidenced by what it would sell for in the
open market, and then adding the value of the lessor's interest similarly
determined, would result in a relatively low total value. On the other
hand, valuation based on the highest and most profitable use for which
the land might reasonably be suitable if it were free from all encum-
brances, would result in a considerably higher award. It thus appears
that at this state of the condemnation proceedings there frequently is a
certain amount of surplus awarded above the actual market value of the
respective interests in the land. It is the division of this award, and hence
of the surplus, among the holders of the respective interests that creates
an economic and legal problem of considerable magnitude which has not
been fully realized by the courts.
Most courts, in applying the unencumbered fee rule, consider that
the award is substituted for the land, and that the various claimants
should share in proportion to the damage suffered by them. 8 Most courts
disregard the possibility that the award might be more or less than the
sum total of the respective interests. Insofar as the award is more or less
than the total of the interests, it would appear that the overage or short-
age should be shared by the respective owners in proportion to the value
of their respective interests.
B. "Contract Rent" and "Economic Rent"
In determining the value of the respective interests of the landlord
and tenant, a brief consideration of "rent" is desirable. The word "rent"
58. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956); Kafka v.
Davidson, 135 Minn. 389, 160 N.W. 1021 (1917); Wilkins v. Oken, 157 Cal. App. 2d 603,
321 P.2d 876 (1958).
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as ordinarily used refers to the payment of a stipulated sum of money
at stated intervals of time for the use of some form of property. Since
this form of payment is usually arranged by contract it is more accurate
to refer to it as "contract rent." This use, however, is not sufficiently
precise for the purpose of economic analysis. Economists have, therefore,
refined the term "rent" to have a more specific meaning. "Economic rent"
is a form of income distinct from wages, interest and profits. It may be
defined as that share of the productivity, or its monetary value, which
may be attributed to the land because of its contribution when land, labor,
capital and management are combined in a productive effort.59
The over-all supply of land is fixed; consequently, rent depends on
the demand for land. The demand for land is influenced in turn by the
productivity of a particular plot of land. This productivity is determined
by both fertility and location. In agricultural areas both fertility and
location determine rent. If two equal size plots of land will produce dif-
ferent yields of grain with the same costs of production, and are so
situated that they have equal costs of transportation to the market, all
other things being equal, the land with the highest yield will have a higher
economic rent. This is measured by the differences in net income pro-
duced by the two plots of land.
In urban areas, land rent arises because of location. Desirable offices
in the heart of a financial district or apartments overlooking a river are
examples of locations which may allow high prices. However, high rents
do not necessarily result because the user may attempt to charge high
prices. They are the resuit of the ability of the land, due to its location,
to do a greater volume of business at a given price. A package of ciga-
rettes costs no more at high rent spots in a large city than at low rent
locations in a rural area. The high rent is caused by the productivity of
the land due to its particular location. °
A potential buyer or a lessee of a piece of real estate attempts to
estimate the economic rent of the land the use of which he is contem-
plating. It is upon the basis of this estimate that he offers a bid for either
a lease or outright purchase of the property.
Hence, it is the economic rent that causes one location to command
a high contract rent and another a low contract rent. It is axiomatic that
a tenant will wish to pay as low a contract rent as possible, while the
landlord will seek a high rent. If at the execution of the lease, both the
lessor and the lessee have adequate knowledge of the potential produc-
59. See generally DODD & HAILSTONES, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 279-280
(4th ed. 1961); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SELECTED READINGS IN
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 55, 88-90, 253 (1953).
60. DODD & HAILSTONES, op. cit. supra note 59, at 281-89; AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL
ESTATE APPRAISERS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 159.
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tivity of the site, the equitable "contract" rent should be identical or in
close approximation to the "economic" rent 61
However, circumstances change, and over the life of a long-term
lease there is likely to be a difference between economic rent and contract
rent. If the contract rent is greater than the monetary value of the pro-
ductivity of the land-economic rent-the landlord gains an unearned
income. Conversely, if the economic rent increases the tenant enjoys the
surplus. This difference between the contract rent and the economic rent
is frequently referred to by appraisers of real estate as the lessee's "bonus
value" in the lease.6
Both the economic and contractual nature of rent have been recog-
nized by the courts. The following are illustrations:
[The word] "rent" as a noun is defined: "A profit out of
land and tenements;" . . . as a verb, "to grant the right to
occupy lands, paying a certain sum therefor," [and also means]
"A certain profit in money, provisions, chattels or labor issuing
out of lands and tenements, in retribution for use," ...rent
somewhat resembles an annuity. Their difference consists in
the fact that the former issues out of land and the latter is a
mere personal charge.63
Rent is an incorporeal hereditament. It is a certain profit
issuing yearly out of lands and tenements.6
The term "rent" is used in different senses. In its largest
signification it may mean all the profit issuing yearly out of
lands, in return for their use.
65
Rent is a sum stipulated to be paid for the actual use and
enjoyment of another's land ...the occupation of the land is
consideration for the rent. "
Thus, generally, the legal and economic concepts of rent harmonize.
Contract rent, from both the legal and economic viewpoints, represents
a payment which arises ultimately out of productivity of the land.
C. Effect of Condemnation
The effect of condemnation on the leasehold estate, in the absence
of an express provision in the lease, varies accordingly as to whether
61. See generally Thorson, Contract vs. Economic Rent, I & II, AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 1197-1228.
62. Sando, Appraisal of Leasehold Interests, SOUTHWESTERN LEAL FOUNDATION, TEM
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 79, 85, 92-94 (1961); McMichael, Appraising Lease-
hold Estates, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SELECTED READINGS IN REAI
ESTATE APPRAISAL 1188, 1192 (1953) ; Continuing Education of the Bar, California Condem-
nation Practice 84 (1960).
63. Cox v. Snyder, 241 11. App. 471, 474 (1926).
64. Brown v. Brown, 33 N.J. Eq. (6 Stew.) 650, 659 (1881).
65. Schuricht v. Broadwell, 4 Mo. App. 160, 161 (1877).
66. Cooper v. Cesco Mercantile Trust Co., 134 Me. 372, 378, 186 Atl. 885, 888 (1936).
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there is an entire or partial taking of the land subject to the leasehold.
When there is an entire taking, the lessee's estate is terminated and his
obligation to pay rent ceases. 7 When there is a partial taking, the lease
is not cancelled under the majority rule, and the lessee's obligation to
pay rent continues.6 8 When this latter situation results, the lessee is
compensated by an award of the present value of the rent with respect
to the part of the real estate taken for the remainder of the term. He is
thus compensated for his loss of the use of a part of the property; hence
he has been made whole, and his obligation under the contract remains
in force.
In this paper attention is confined to the rights of the landlord and
tenant where there has been a complete taking of the leased property.
The rights of the parties to the award are frequently complicated by the
existence of improvements, which may have been erected by the lessee,
and which may or may not by contract belong to the lessee at the termi-
nation of the lease. If the improvements are substantial, they normally
inure to the landlord at the termination of the lease. Apportionment
must be made between the landlord and tenant according to their re-
spective interests in both the land and the improvements.69
D. Theory of Apportionment
The theory of a fair apportionment of the condemnation award
between landlord and tenant, when there has been a taking of the entire
property, will be considered in the remaining sections of this paper.
Disregarding the amount representing the value of the improvements,7 °
there still remains a difficult problem of apportioning the award. As
previously noted,71 the condemnation of the whole parcel terminates the
lease and relieves the tenant from the further obligation of paying rent.
Thus, theoretically, if the fair rental value of the premises is equivalent
to the contract rental which the lessee was obligated to pay the landlord,
the lessee should receive no part of the award. The market value of his
lease was equivalent to his rental obligations, which have been cancelled,
and therefore he is amply compensated for the loss of his leasehold.
72
If, however, the use of the land which the lessee has purchased is
67. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 287 (1950).
68. Id. at 288. The author criticizes this majority rule and contends that proportionate
reduction in rent would be more businesslike. Condemnation clauses are now rather common,
providing that upon a taking by eminent domain, whether partial or complete, the term
shall come to an end. 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 50, at 300.
69. See generally JAHR, op. cit. supra note 52, at 190-98; note 70 infra.
70. See generally Hitchings, The Valuation of Leasehold Interests and Some Elements
of Damage Thereto, SOUTIIWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMINENT DO-MAIN 61, 66 (1960); Note, Methods of Establishing "Just Compensation" In
Eminent Domain Proceedings in Illinois, LAW FORUM 289, 304-05 (1957); 2 ORGEL, VALUA-
TION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 6, 7 (1953); JAHR, op. cit. supra note 52, at 195-98.
71. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
72. Sando, supra note 62, at 84, 85; 4 NicHoLs, op. cit. supra note 50, at 316.
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contributing a surplus to his enterprise over and above its cost to him,
he has not been made whole by simply removing his obligation to pay
rent. In terms of economic analysis, if his "contract" rent is less than
the "economic" rent of the land, he has incurred an actual loss. The loss
is equal to the difference between the two.7 Legal and economic concepts
are in general agreement on this point. The measure of damages suffered
by a lessee when a leasehold estate is terminated under the law of eminent
domain is the difference in value between the market value of the lease-
hold and the amount (contract rent) which the lessee is obligated to pay.
The following excerpts are typical:
The measure of damages, in determining just compensation
to which the lessor is entitled upon condemnation of leasehold,
is the difference between value of the use and occupancy of the
leasehold for the remainder of the tenant's term . . . less the
agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such use and
occupancy.
74
The correct measure of damages to a tenant on the taking
of his leasehold interest by condemnation is the market value
of the use and occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder of
the tenant's term minus the agreed rent which the tenant would
pay for such use and occupancy."'
The measure of a lessee's damages for the condemnation of
his leasehold interest is said to be the market value of the lease-
hold condemned, that is, the difference between the rental value
of the remainder of the term and the rent reserved in the lease
or the actual value of the leasehold when there is no market
value.76
The concept of economic rent is readily found in the literature de-
scribing the philosophy and content of the law relative to eminent domain
in such sources as appraisal journals and accepted textbooks on appraisal
of real estate. The concept, however, generally lacks a basis in statute
law and judicial decisions. Although the implications of the term are
abundant, the actual reference to economic rent is seldom found in strictly
legal pronouncements. 8
The avoidance of the term "economic" rent in statutory and judicial
pronouncements is not surprising. The precise measurement of economic
73. In re Mott Haven Houses, Borough of Bronx, 33 Misc. 2d 808, 227 N.Y.S.2d 858
(Sup. Ct. 1960); 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 50, at 417; Sando, supra note 62, at 84, 85;
2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 287.
74. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 977, 978 (1st Cir.
1946).
75. United States v. Advertising Checking Bureau, 204 F.2d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1953).
76. Pierson v. H. R. Leonard Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 521, 256 N.W. 529, 533
(1934).
77. See, e.g., references in notes 59-61 supra; Hitchings, supra note 70, at 66.
78. The term is used in Rossi v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 205, 223 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. CI. 1961);
Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962).
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rent has long perplexed the academic economist. Within a classroom,
using a hypothetical model and carefully defining each and every assump-
tion, it is theoretically possible. To measure economic rent as it con-
tributes to the profit of an actual business concern is much more difficult.
There is no practical way of isolating the actual productivity which is
directly attributable to the land separately from the other elements of
production.
The legal profession, and largely without the aid of academic econ-
omists, has arrived at a practical solution for the determination of eco-
nomic rent. Further, the determination is in accord with sound economic
theory. The solution of the law is the concept of fair rental value as an
imputed measure of economic rent. By adjudication, fair rental value has
become the market value of the lease.79 This in turn becomes the price
determined by a willing buyer and a willing seller through the impartial
workings of a free and competitive market.
The legal concept of "fair market value" is economically sound. It
is based on the valid assumption that in a competitive market the true
value of a piece of property can be accurately determined. This value
will be the amount of money prudent business men will pay for the use
of a piece of land. While there will be a range of prices offered for the
use of a particular piece of property, no prudent and competent business-
man will offer to pay a greater rent for property than "the land will
support." If these offers are the result of competitive bidding by business
men who are willing to risk their capital and productive ventures of
varied types, there should be a close approximation of their bids to
economic rent based upon the "highest and best use" of the land. The
lower amounts will be offered by enterprises which are not as suitable
for this location as are those which offer the higher rents.
Sales of leases on comparable plots of ground in the past, and new
leases which have been negotiated on land of similar location, are a con-
sensus of many businessmen regarding the value of the inherent qualities
of the land. If the contract were negotiated by buyers and sellers of equal
ability and bargaining power, then the selling price of the leases, the
"contract" rent, will be a close approximation of the "economic" rent.
When the current "contract" rent on a similar piece of property is higher
than the "contract" rent stipulated in the lease on the condemned prop-
erty, the difference in the two amounts can be measured. The magnitude
79. See Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So.2d 687 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1959), recognizing the validity of the text statement but reversing the trial court
because fair market value is not an exclusive standard in Florida, and approving the
"summation" [see note 84 infra] method of leasehold valuation in the instant case; State
v. Levy, 136 So.2d 35 (La. 1961); Ballantyne v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d
486 (1962); In re Appropriation For Highway Purposes, 169 Ohio St. 309, 159 N.E.2d 456
(1959); Sackman, Compensation Upon the Partial Taking of A Leasehold Interest, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EmINT DomAiN 39, 49 (1961).
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of this difference is the amount which prudent business men have collec-
tively agreed and given as the measure of the "bonus value" of the lease
to the lessee. They have simultaneously determined the measure of dam-
ages to the leasehold estate. This measure of damages, of "just compensa-
tion," should be the difference between the rent stipulated in the lease
and the market price at which the new lease could be negotiated.80 If the
current offer is less than the rent agreed in the contract, the lessee is
freed from his unprofitable position. Since he has suffered no damage, he
is not entitled to share in the award which stands in lieu of the property."'
E. Divergence between Theory and Practice
Theoretically the approach to valuation is the same whether the
entire fee or a fragmented interest is being appraised, and the standard
in both instances is that of fair market value. In the case of leaseholds,
however, the concept is somewhat illusory. Since there is no common
trading place for real estate, the estimation of market value is not as
simple as is the case with listed stocks and fungible goods. The deter-
mination of market value is even more complex with leases. If there are
sufficient sales of comparable leases in the vicinity, there is little or no
problem. However, this is rarely true 2 since leases are never exactly alike.
Each leasehold is sui generis. Each term and covenant of each lease
contributes to the basic value of the lease.
Because of the great difficulty in attempting an intrinsic appraisal
and obtaining suitable market data, most textbooks and appraisal man-
uals tend to seek a more direct and less debatable method of computing
the value of a leasehold. Many appraisers, therefore, tend to follow the
suggestions found in their manuals.
In most appraisal problems the estimation of the value of
the lessor's interest is relatively simple when compared with the
problem of estimating the lessee's interest. This is particularly
true when the property has been improved with the structure
at the expense of the lessee. Because of this many appraisers
first value the property as a freehold, then estimate the lessor's
interest and, by subtraction, reach an opinion of the value of
the lessee's interest.83
When property has been leased, the lessor's interest con-
sists of the right of collection of the agreed rentals and the right
of repossession of the property at the end of the lease term.
The value of the lessor's interest is thus (1) the present worth
of the net rents that he is to receive in addition to (2) the
80. See generally notes 74-76, 79 supra; 4 NicHoLS, op. cit. supra note 50 at 314-315.
81. Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962); State v.
Levy, 126 So.2d 35 (La. 1961) ; Sackman, supra note 79, at 49.
82. JAHR, op. cit. supra note 52, at 194.
83. McMichael, supra note 62, at 1191.
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present worth of the value of the property to be repossessed at
the time of the termination of the lease.8 4
The appraisal of a lessor's interest in a well secured ground
lease is a comparatively simple performance as it involves
merely finding a present worth of the various periodic rent
contributions called for under the terms of the lease contract.8 5
The result of this procedure might be illustrated by the following
hypothetical case. A 60-year lease was executed on January 15, 1940,
for a piece of property upon which the lessee erected a building. The
lease called for a rental payment of $10,000 and the lessee agreed to pay
all taxes and assessments. On January 15, 1960, the property was con-
demned and the court awarded a sum of $500,000 based upon the market
value of the entire property. In attempting an apportionment of the
award, the attorneys sought the aid of several appraisers, a composite
statement of whom might read as follows:
Based on the award made by the jury resulting from the
taking of the above property by the Board of Public Instruc-
tion, I have reviewed the property including the provisions of
the existing lease.
In appraising the lessor's interest I have used the annual
annuity method and have used a rate of 7%. I have selected
this rate because the risk is not great and the property has
been improved.
In my opinion the interest of the lessor in this leased fee is
$10,000 annually for a period of 40 years, or on a 7 per cent
basis, the value of the existing income flow is $133,320.00 plus
the value of the reversion, which at 7 per cent 40 years hence
based on the total award, is $1,695.00, or the total value of the
fee, subject to the existing lease is $135,015, say $135,000.
The value of the lessee's interest is, in my opinion,
$364,985, say $365,000.
It is obvious that the appraiser treated the landlord's rental income
as an annuity and converted this future income into a present day capital
value. To this current value of the future income he added the reversion-
ary interest to arrive at the lessor's share. The value of the lessee's in-
terest was then determined by simply subtracting this figure from the
84. SCTIMUTZ, THE APPRAISAL PROCESS 169 (1948). A Florida court gave this definition:
This method [summation] consists of first determining the fair market value of the
property being condemned, free of the leasehold estate. The next step in the process
consisted of adding to the reversionary value of the fee at the termination of the
lease the reserved rent payable during the remainder of the term, and reducing the
total to its present worth by application of the appropriate annuity tables. The last
figure thus reached represented the witness' opinion as to what constituted the
present value of the fee subject to the lease which, when deducted from the present
market value of the unencumbered fee, left a remainder which represented the value
of the leasehold. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110
So.2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
85. Thorson, supra note 61, at 1202.
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total award. 6 An arbitrary method of apportionment such as this must
be examined in the light of the philosophy of capitalization. The basic
premise is the assumption that the position of the lessor is analogous to
that of the holder of a bond. 7 He expects to receive a fixed income from
his property for the life of the lease. Rental income is therefore like an
annuity and the problem is resolved simply by transforming these annu-
ity payments into the present value of future net incomes.
Since present money commands a premium over future money, one
is disposed to pay less for that which is to be enjoyed in the future than
that which is to be enjoyed in the present. Stated differently, future
amounts have a present day value which is less than face value. The
difference is an amount equal to the loss of interest during the time until
the future collection period. By this reasoning, the present worth of an
annuity of $10,000 annually, payable at the end of the year, for a term
of 50 years, when discounted at 6% interest, is $157,618.60. The same
method and philosophy is used in determining the value of the reversion.
A sum of $400,000 to be received in 50 years is at six per cent interest
worth $21,600 today.8
When the value of any property right is computed in this manner,
the most important element in determining the value of that right is the
capitalization rate. Yet little, if any, consideration is ever given to a
scientific analysis of the reasons for the selection of a particular rate.
Appraisers' reports are likely to indicate that the particular capitalization
rate was selected because "it is the prevalent return in investments of
this character," or "my 20 years of experience indicates this to be the
current market rate. '8 9 In most cases the court is faced with evidence
86. As to valuation procedures, including discussions on such methods as capitaliza-
tion, Inwood and discount, see generally Sando, supra note 62, at 85; Hitchings, supra note
70, at 66; Thorson, supra note 61, at 1197-1228; McMichael, supra note 62, at 1192.
87. Thorson, supra note 61, at 1200, 1201.
88. When the rental income is treated as an annuity the present value is the sum of the
present values of all the payments. The present value of the first payment per dollar is
(1 + r)-l; the present value of subsequent payments is (1 + r) -n per dollar of the annual
rent. Hence by the application of a formula for the sum of the terms of a geometric series,
we have the present values of all the annual payments.
Because these values are so often computed and to simplify the work involved, tables
of the value of $1 per period (n) are published for the convenience of determining the
present value of future incomes. Thus, the present value of a rental income of $10,000 a
year for a period of 50 years is computed by referring to a table such as that given below:
PRESENT VALUE OF AN An=
n 1% 5% 6% 7%
1 0.99009 0.97087 0.94339 0.93457
5 4.85343 4.32947 4.21236 4.10019
10 9.47130 7.72173 7.36008 7.02358
20 18.04555 12.46221 11.46992 10.59401
50 39.19611 18.25592 15.76186 13.80074
$10,000 X 15.76186 - $157,618.60
89. Under the prevalent practice of the undivided fee rule, the apportionment of the
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indicating several prevailing "current market rates." 90 It is axiomatic
that the witnesses employed by the landlord will view the current market
rate at several percentage points lower than those of the tenant. Yet all
the witnesses base their valuation on the "current market rate." The
following table shows the results of a varying rate of interest in the value
of an annuity income.
TABLE
Present Worth of An Annuity (Rental Income) of $1,000 per annum at Various











It is not the purpose of this paper to conduct a study of capitalization
rates. The table is sufficient to indicate the inherent weakness of this
method. The point to be emphasised is that this is the method by which
expert witnesses commonly attempt to determine the value of a leasehold
interest. The lessor's interest is determined by treating his rental income
as an annuity. The remainder of the award, less the pittance of the
reversion,' is by inference the lessee's interest.
F. Criticism of the Capitalization Method in Apportionment Cases
It is obviously a simple and routine task to determine the lessor's
award takes place in an ancillary proceeding, usually before a judge alone. The distribution
of the award is likely to become somewhat anti-climatic with the parties discouraged from
the delays of litigation and amenable to compromise. Because of these factors the actual
mechanics of apportionment are only infrequently revealed in published appellate reports.
Occasional reference to divergent capitalization rates, or to the fact that the rate selected
was within the range of those suggested, can be found. It is because of this lack of judicial
scrutiny, because of the difficulty of determining valuations, and because also of the natural
tendency to seek security in mathematical computations, that a proper understanding of the
philosophy of capitalization is important.
In United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 296 F.2d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 1961),
the court referred to an appraiser who based his opinion on "his market information,"
and then remarked that at no point did the appraiser reveal the source of his market in-
formation.
In Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So.2d 687, 689 (Fla.
1st. Dist. 1959), the use of the summation method was justified by the witness on the basis
that it was the accepted method of appraising. See note 84 supra for an explanation of the
summation method.
90. In United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 296 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961),
seven experts estimated the remaining economic life of the buildings from a low of 30 to a
high of 50 years and the capitalization rate variously at 51/2, 6, 6Y and 7%.
91. For example, a sum of $1,000, discounted at a rate of 6% for 50 years, has a current
value of $54.30.
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interest in a leasehold estate by merely capitalizing the rental income of
the property. To many appraisers this method has the advantage of limit-
ing the scope of professional and expert opinion to a single point which
might be open to dispute, namely, the rate of capitalization. This method
frees appraisers of the difficult task of determining the fair market value
of the lease. The economists' criticism of this approach lies neither with
the philosophy nor the mechanics of discounting the future rental income
into a current cash value. It is far more fundamental than merely object-
ing to the methodology of an average appraiser. The criticism of the
economist is directed to three major areas in which he disputes both the
logic and the validity of the assumptions underlying the appraiser's
technique.
First, a fundamental error is made when the appraiser considers the
lessee's interest to be the total award less the value of the discounted
rental income. Such reasoning ignores the fact that the sum total of
the separate interests is usually less than the value of the undivided fee.
Because of consideration of the highest and best use, and other dis-
pensations made to the property owner, the total award is frequently
greater than the sum of the separate interests." Provision should be
made for apportioning this surplus.
The error of the method above described lies in the fact that the
lessee's property right, the privilege or liberty of use for a limited time,
becomes more valuable than the sum total of all the remaining rights
and privileges. The method ignores the fact that the lessor's interest
consists of the entire multitude of property rights less those given to
the tenant. The lessee does not have the ultimate right of disposal of
his property right, for in most leases the obligations of the lessee do not
terminate when he subleases. His is only a restricted right which is
subject to termination on default of his obligation. At the end of the
term, the whole estate reverts to the landlord.
Thus, it would seem as a matter of logic, that if the total award
is greater than the sum of the individual interests, as it often is, all
the surplus should not go to the tenant, the holder of the lesser inter-
est. It would be more just that the surplus (1) be returned to the pub-
lic treasury, (2) go to the holder of the major interest in the property,
the landlord, or (3) be apportioned between the landlord and tenant.
Nevertheless, the method described above ignores this question and gives
all the surplus to the tenant.
A second criticism of the capitalization technique is the contrasting
fashion in which the interests of the lessor and lessee are treated in the
distribution of the award. The lessor's interest is treated as an annuity
92. See text following note 53 supra.
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to be discounted to a present day value, while the lessee's interest is
considered a windfall profit and is not subject to discounting. With
this in mind, the economist asks "why is not sauce for the goose sauce
for the gander?" If it is to be assumed that the contract rent would be
forthcoming in the future, is it not equal justice to assume that the
"bonus" value of the lease, i.e., the difference between the economic rent
and the contract rent,93 will accrue to the lessee in annual installments
rather than in a lump sum? If justice is to be uniform it would seem
that both parties to the distribution should be treated in a like manner.
If the lessor is to pay a penalty for acquiring the value of his rental
annuity in a single payment, should not the lessee pay an equal penalty?
This entire discussion becomes somewhat pedantic when one realizes
the faulty logic involved in treating the potential future contract rent
as an integral part of the condemnation award. It is a universal rule
that the taking of an entire property terminates the lease. 4 There is
therefore no guaranteed future income to be discounted. This is self-
evident when one realizes that the termination of the contract frees
the lessee of his obligation to pay rent.
A court or jury in arriving at the total value of the condemnation
award does not consider that there is in the award a discounted present-
day value of future income. The award is determined by the current
market value of the unencumbered property. There is no implication
that any property right is to be treated differently from any other. Since
the award stands in lieu of the property, all future interests in the prop-
erty are cancelled and transferred into the award. If the future claims
on the property are cancelled, and the lease itself is voided, it is only
logical to assume that future incomes generated by this property will
also terminate. The appraiser, however, chooses to ignore this fact.
Hence, appraisers using the capitalization method submit to the court
a current or present day value of an nonexistent future income.
The third criticism of the capitalization method as a basis for
apportioning the award is the most important. This criticism is simply
that the method used by many appraisers and expounded in their man-
uals, as delineated above, does not coincide with legal standards. It is
axiomatic, for example, that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff.
Thus, when a lessee lays claim to a share of the condemnation award,
the burden of proof is on him as to the value of his leasehold. He must
show that he has suffered a detriment by the loss of his leasehold.
[Where tenants sought part of the award in a condem-
nation proceeding, it was held that] to recover, they must show
93. See text following note 71 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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by the weight of the evidence that the market value of the
leases was greater than the rent reserved . . .9
The measure of damages of a tenant is, as indicated above, 6 the market
value of what he has lost.
The measure of damages is the fair market value of the
estate so taken; or if only a part thereof be taken, the mea-
sure of damages is the difference between the fair market value
of the entire leasehold estate and the fair market value of the
portion thereof not taken."
The general theory of apportionment has been stated as follows:
In such cases [condemnation of the whole fee] the awards
of compensation should be for the market value of the prop-
erty as a whole with apportionment as between the lessor and
lessee according to the respective interests.98
[The] guiding principle of just compensation is reim-
bursement to the owner for the property interest taken ...
[The owner] is entitled to be put in as good a position pecu-
niarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made
whole but he is not entitled to more. 99
'These principles as enunciated by the courts are generally absent
from the methodology of the appraisers' manuals, and the technique of
apportionment as set out above. The determination of the lessor's and
lessee's interests under common practice is often confined to the mech-
anical computation of the present value of annuity income. The dif-
ference between the value of the annuity and the total award is
arbitrarily concluded to be the value of the leasehold estate. It is neither
a measure of the damages suffered by the lessee nor an approximation
of the market value of the lease. Therefore, it is not in accord with
either the spirit or the letter of the law. It is merely a convenient way
of refusing to admit a lack of knowledge of current real estate values. °0
95. City of Newark v. Eisner, 100 N.J. Eq. 101, 102, 135 Atl. 86, 87 (1926). Accord
(as to burden of proof on tenant), State v. Levy, 136 So.2d 35 (La. 1961).
96. See text following note 73 supra.
97. Kafka v. Davidson, 135 Minn. 389, 160 N.W. 1021, 1023 (1917).
98. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n v. Hedberg-Freidheim Co., 226
Minn. 282, 287, 32 N.W.2d 569, 572 (1948).
99. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1960). See also
Theory of Apportionment, Part II D., supra.
100. The authors acknowledge that market value is not the sole technique in appraising
real estate under eminent domain, and have attempted to point this out at various places.
See, e.g., notes 29, 45-49 supra and accompanying text. The fact, however, that comparable
sales or market data is not the exclusive approach to valuation does not detract from the
validity of the criticisms herein discussed in those cases where market value is the basis of
the award to be apportioned. For examples of instances where other than market data were
used to determine the value of the condemned land, see State v. Gras, 141 So,2d 35 (La.
1962), using capitalization of income method; State v. Frellsen, 135 So.2d 378 (La. 1961),
using reproduction or replacement cost method..
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IV. CONCLUSION
The law of eminent domain, as formulated by the courts, in general
shows a remarkable adherence to the principles of orthodox economics.
The principle of economics involved is the substitution of a sum of money
for the value of property rights which have been taken. In case of the
valuation of an unencumbered fee, the solution is generally within the
framework of orthodox economic price theory, and the results are
good.'o'
In the distribution of a condemnation award between divergent
interests, however, particularly in a case of lessor and lessee, the results
are less satisfactory. These unsatisfactory results arise from the prac-
tice of valuing the fee as if it were unencumbered, and then apportioning
the award without a thorough understanding of the philosophy of the
capitalization method of valuation. When the apportionment is based
solely on the capitalization of the lessor's interest, a different philosophy
is used in computing the award than is used in distributing it. This
change of philosophy arises not from a conscious desire of the courts;
indeed, just the opposite is reflected in the decisions, but because of
the difficulties in ascertaining independently the market value of a
lease, and because the mathematical computations of the expert wit-
ness have an illusion of certainty which lulls the participants into over-
looking the underlying philosophy behind the capitalization method.
The courts have in general proclaimed that the same standard of
fair market value shall be used in determining the value of all property
interests taken. It is not too much to impose upon them the further
In condemnation of leasehold interests in Wherry Housing Projects, methods other than
market data are commonly employed because of the lack of comparable sales. The problem
there, however, is similar to the problem of determining the value of a fee where there is
"no market value" since the only estate being taken is the leasehold and there is no appor-
tionment problem. See United States v. 190.71 Acres of Land in Lake County, Ill., 300 F.2d
52 (7th Cir. 1962), using capitalization of income and evidence of original cost; United States
v. Certain Interests In Property, 296 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961), and United States v. Tampa
Bay Garden Apartments, 294 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961), both using capitalization of income
method.
101. This, of course, is a matter of opinion. See, for example, Note, 67 YALE L.J. 61
(1957). The fact that different experts may have widely varying opinions as to the market
value of a particular parcel does not per se indict the standard. It is the function of the
jury to weigh the evidence and to determine credibility. It is doubtful that any other
standard would result in mathematical certainty. The difficulty of determining damages in
other areas, as for example, in personal injury cases, is at least equally as great. Consider
also, the problem of determining a dollar value for pain and suffering, the estimation of
future medical expenses and loss of earnings for many years in the future, and the computa-
tion of a monetary value for loss of consortium. It should also be pointed out that al-
lowance for additional damages, for example, moving expenses, loss of profits or similar
items, will not necessarily obviate the necessity of determining market value, or constructing
some other standard, representing the worth of the land (property) taken. Compensation
will have to be awarded on some basis for the value of the land (property) itself irrespec-
tive of any additional damages that may be authorized.
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duty of seeing that the same standard is in fact applied. Further, it is
not too much to impose upon the professional appraisers the duty of
securing adequate training in the underlying philosophies behind their
methods of appraisal. Only with a thorough understanding of the phi-
losophy behind appraisal techniques, and with an understanding of the
purpose for which the valuation is sought, can a really intelligent
appraisal be made in each instance. A full appreciation of these funda-
mental concepts on the part of all parties, the attorneys, the appraisers,
and the judges, will result in sound appraisal and apportionment, and
will also prevent wide divergences between the actual practices and
standards set by the courts.
